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I. INTRODUCTION
Among the most enduring debates in international trade law is how
should we understand the legal1 relationship between the multilateral trading
system, as established by the law of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
and preferential trade agreements (PTAs).2 This debate is generated by a
fundamental conflict between the WTO’s central legal obligation of nondiscrimination,3 which requires WTO Member states to accord equal
treatment to the goods and services of other Member states, and PTAs, which
by definition allow Member states to accord more favorable market access to
some trading partners while excluding others. If PTAs “entrench the very
discrimination that WTO rules seek to eliminate,”4 how should the legal
relationship between them be understood?
The tension between the WTO and PTAs has dogged the international
trading system since its inception in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) in 1947 and through its institutional transformation into the
WTO in 1995.5 The multilateral trading system has always provided
Member states with the right to form preferential trade agreements—most
famously in Article XXIV of the GATT.6 But throughout its history, the
1
In this paper, we largely put to one side the important economic debates about the
relationship between multilateral and regional trade. For important commentary on the
economic aspects of regionalism, see, e.g., JACOB VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE (1950);
JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK (1991); Jagdish Bhagwati,
Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN REGIONAL
INTEGRATION (Jaime de Melo & Arvind Panagariya eds., 1993); Paul Krugman, Regionalism
Versus Multilateralism: Analytical Notes, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION
(Jaime de Melo & Arvind Panagariya eds., 1993).
2
In this paper, we use the term “preferential trade agreements” (PTAs) to refer to treaties
regulating trade between two or more WTO Member states, including customs unions and free
trade agreements. While the WTO uses the term “regional trade agreements” (Regional Trade
Agreements, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited Nov. 6,
2017)), we prefer the term PTAs because many such agreements are not regional in nature,
and because the term “preferential” highlights the fact that the agreements diverge from MFN.
But see JAMES H. MATHIS, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE GATT / WTO: ARTICLE
XXIV AND THE INTERNAL TRADE REQUIREMENT, at xx (2002) (adopting RTAs as preferred
terminology).
3
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT] (articulating the so-called “most favored nation” obligation).
4
Nicolas J.S. Lockhart & Andrew D. Mitchell, Regional Trade Agreements Under GATT
1994: An Exception and its Limits, in CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE WTO 217, 219
(Andrew D. Mitchell ed., 2005).
5
For a discussion of the history of the relationship between PTAs and the GATT, see
MATHIS, supra note 2, at 1–11.cx.
6
GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV. See also General Agreement on Trade in Services art.
V, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
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legal limits that GATT/WTO law places on the right to form PTAs have
remained frustratingly opaque. Member states have generally failed to come
to any agreement on whether the PTAs notified to the WTO have complied
with the requirements of Article XXIV. And while scholars hoped that the
WTO’s permanent Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) would more
clearly articulate and enforce the requirements of Article XXIV, they have
found little guidance in the WTO’s jurisprudence. In particular, scholars
have argued that the leading WTO case on the interpretation of Article
XXIV—the Turkey – Textiles dispute from 1999—leaves many unanswered
questions regarding the legal relationship between the WTO and PTAs.7
Scholars have argued that the case is “inconclusive,”8 leaving Article XXIV
“mired in doubt.”9
In the contemporary moment, the international trading system is facing a
new range of political developments in favor of establishing preferential
trading arrangements of very different types. On the one hand, the slate of
Megaregional trade agreements currently under negotiation and
implementation has focused on deep regional integration through regulatory
cooperation and other types of non-tariff barrier reductions.10 On the other
hand, President Donald Trump has called for the United States to pursue
bilateral trade agreements and to renegotiate regional arrangements such as
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to better protect U.S.
markets by exploiting the United States’ negotiating power and through the

1B,1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS]; Differential and More Favorable Treatment,
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 203 (1980) [hereinafter Enabling Clause].
7
Panel Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO
Doc. WT/DS34/R (May 31, 1999) [hereinafter Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles]; Appellate
Body Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter AB Report, Turkey – Textiles].
8
Peter Hilpold, Regional Integration According to Article XXIV GATT – Between Law and
Politics, 7 MAX PLANCK U.N.Y.B. 219, 224 (2003).
9
Lockhart & Mitchell, supra note 4, at 252.
10
The current slate of “Megaregionals” and other regional arrangements under negotiation
(and renegotiation or, in the case of CPTPP, at the ratification stage) includes the
Comprehensive Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CTPP); the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP); the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP);
the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA); and the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). For more discussion of this new slate of agreements, see the MegaReg project at
NYU’s Institute for International Law and Justice. MegaReg, INST. FOR INT’L L. & JUST.,
http://www.iilj.org/megareg/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2017). See also CHAD BOWN, MEGAREGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE FUTURE OF THE WTO (Council on Foreign Rel. ed.,
2016); MEGA-REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CETA, TTIP, AND TISA: NEW ORIENTATIONS
FOR EU EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (Stefan Griller, Walter Obwexer & Erich Vranes
eds., 2017).
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use of protectionist legal mechanisms like safeguards.11 These different
approaches to regionalism bring the enduring problem of how to understand
the legal relationship between the WTO and PTAs to the fore.
If new PTAs, including both ever-deeper modalities of integration and
new forms of protectionism, are under negotiation, it is essential to know the
rules of the game—to understand how WTO law regulates and limits what
Member states can agree to in PTAs. This Article seeks to clarify some
important aspects of the WTO/PTA relationship by exploring a novel
interpretation of WTO jurisprudence. In particular, we focus our analysis on
Turkey – Textiles, the leading case on Article XXIV; although, we also seek
to highlight other neglected cases that help to define the legal terms of the
WTO/PTA relationship. While the WTO’s PTA jurisprudence is often
thought to have left many questions about the WTO/PTA relationship
unsettled—including which WTO obligations can be derogated through
forming PTAs and whether Member states can oust WTO adjudicatory
jurisdiction through PTAs—we argue that Turkey – Textiles and other
subsequent jurisprudence offers important legal guidance on when the right
to form a PTA is consistent with the law of the WTO. This guidance is
particularly relevant to the types of PTAs that are currently under
negotiation.
In conducting this analysis, we explore the WTO’s jurisprudence through
a conceptual lens that we have begun to develop in prior writing:12 What we
have termed a “pluralist” approach to understanding the law of the WTO.
This approach has several important features. Our approach resists a
constitutional or totalizing approach to legal authority under the law of the

11

See, e.g., The President’s 2017 Trade Policy Agenda, OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2017/AnnualReport/Chapter%20I%20-%20The%
20President%27s%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2018); Geoffrey
Gertz, What Will Trump’s Embrace of Bilateralism Mean for America’s Trade Partners?,
BROOKINGS (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/02/08/w
hat-will-trumps-embrace-of-bilateralism-mean-for-americas-trade-partners/; Claude Barfield,
Bilateral Trade Teals a ‘Yuge’ Waste of Time, Resources, THE HILL (Jan. 26, 2017), http://
thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/316267-bilateral-trade-deals-a-yuge-waste-of-time-r
esources; The Trump Administration’s Trade Strategy is Dangerously Outdated, ECONOMIST
(Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/217179 98-it-will-behard-deal-china-today-if-it-were-japan-1980s-trump.
12
Robert Howse & Joanna Langille, Permitting Pluralism: The Seal Products Dispute and
Why the WTO Should Accept Trade Restrictions Justified by Noninstrumental Moral Values,
37 YALE J. INT’L L. 367 (2012) [hereinafter Howse & Langille, Permitting Pluralism]; Robert
Howse et al., Pluralism in Practice: Moral Legislation and the Law of the WTO After Seals
Products, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 81 (2015) [hereinafter Howse et al., Pluralism in
Practice].
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WTO.13 We take seriously the idea that WTO law can accommodate
competing sites of legal authority, including the right of WTO Member states
to regulate through domestic legislation for reasons that they consider to be
important (what has been termed the “right to regulate”).14 This focus on
regulatory autonomy and the need to protect the policy space of WTO
Members has also led us to argue that a particular conception of
liberalization is most consistent with the goals and aims of the WTO.
Instead of liberalization conceived of as deregulation on the one hand or as
regulatory harmonization on the other, we focus on the non-discriminatory
aspect of free trade. Thus, according to our grundnorm, WTO law
guarantees a certain kind of policy space and seeks to promote a certain kind
of liberalization. This perspective also generates the need for the WTO’s
adjudicatory bodies to be able to take jurisdiction over important questions
that go to the states’ right to regulate and to the meaning of liberalization.15
This paper begins to connect this perspective to the regionalism issue—how
can we conceive of a system in which PTAs are permitted (as an alternative
and novel source of legal authority and norm generation in their own right)
without hollowing out the state and its fundamental right to regulate, on the
one hand, and without eviscerating the WTO’s disciplines that protect
liberalization conceived as non-discrimination, on the other?
While this Article will not provide a complete or comprehensive picture
of the relationship between the multilateral and regional systems, it will
highlight important aspects of the legal restrictions imposed by WTO law on
PTAs that are particularly relevant to today’s regulatory context. Contrary to
the common perception that WTO jurisprudence is too vague to provide
much guidance on how PTAs can be rendered compatible with the law of the
WTO, we argue that in fact there are important indications from WTO case
law that specify when PTAs are WTO-compliant.

13
This can be contrasted with those who argue that the WTO is a constitutional regime. See,
e.g., DEBORAH Z. CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
177 (2005); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Why Constitutionalism Now?: Text, Context and the Historical
Contingency of Ideas, 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 191 (2005); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Theories
of Justice, Human Rights, and the Constitution of International Markets, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
407 (2003); ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1997).
14
See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products,
WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter China – Publications]. Another aspect of this
conception is seeing GATT Article XX as not an exception/carve out but as an integral
element of the normative balance in the regime established by WTO law.
15
See Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by
Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9 (2016); Howse & Langille, Permitting Pluralism, supra note 12.
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This Article will proceed in four parts. In Part II, we provide a brief
review of the legal interface between the WTO and PTAs, focusing on
Article XXIV of the GATT, and outline what are thought to be important
ambiguities in the WTO/PTA relationship. Parts III and IV examine
Turkey – Textiles with fresh eyes. We provide an overview of the facts and
the Panel Report in Part III, and in Part IV we explore the Appellate Body’s
reasons. We argue that the Appellate Body’s report (particularly when read
in dialogue with the Panel’s report, and with our pluralist approach in mind)
actually addresses many of the core ambiguities that scholars have argued
pervade the WTO/PTA relationship. These include the meaning of important
terms within Article XXIV and which GATT obligations can be contracted
out of through PTAs. Part IV also addresses an important ambiguity in the
WTO’s internal separation of powers: Whether the WTO’s adjudicatory
bodies have the power—vis-à-vis the WTO’s Member states—to determine
whether the general requirements for a customs union or free trade area are
met by a proposed PTA. Part V considers another fundamental ambiguity in
the relationship between the WTO and PTAs: Competing jurisdiction to
adjudicate between the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure and those
developed by PTAs.
II. THE WTO/PTA LEGAL RELATIONSHIP: ARTICLE XXIV AND ITS
AMBIGUITIES
The legal relationship between the WTO and PTAs is set out in several
WTO disciplines and agreements including:16 Article XXIV of the GATT,
which covers trade in goods; the so-called Enabling Clause, which provides
special and differential treatment for developing countries and which largely
exempts PTAs between developing countries from the requirements of
GATT Article XXIV;17 the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article
XXIV, a product of the Uruguay Round;18 Article V of the GATS, which
covers trade in services;19 and the waiver power granted to the WTO’s
political organs by Article IX(3) of the WTO Agreement, which authorizes
16
There are other relevant provisions that are excluded from this list, such as the TBT
Agreement and SPS Agreement provisions on bilateral mutual recognition agreements; the
Agreement on Safeguards; GATS Article V bis, which applies to labor market integration
agreements; and the Agreement on Rules of Origin, which covers rules of origin in PTAs.
17
See Enabling Clause, supra note 6.
18
GATS, supra note 6.
19
The GATS was a result of the Uruguay Round of negotiations that produced the WTO,
and it expands WTO disciplines to cover trade in services. GATS Article V addresses PTAs
that impact services. The Article contains four main provisions that largely mirror the
requirements of GATT Article XXIV.
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the WTO’s Ministerial Conference to waive WTO legal obligations.20 But
while these other provisions have played important roles in defining the
contours of the WTO/PTA legal relationship, GATT Article XXIV has been
the locus of most scholarly debate and GATT/WTO practice and
jurisprudence. This Article will therefore largely focus on how Article
XXIV constructs the WTO/PTA relationship.21 This Part provides a brief
overview of Article XXIV and its key ambiguities.
A. Article XXIV
We can begin by considering five key requirements set out in the text of
Article XXIV. First, Article XXIV limits the type of PTAs that Member
states are permitted to establish. The chapeau of Article XXIV(5) provides
that the “provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent” Member states from
forming: (1) customs unions (CUs), (2) free trade areas (FTAs), and (3)
interim agreements necessary for the formation of a CU or an FTA.22 Article
XXIV(8) goes on to define what CUs and FTAs are. Both customs unions
and FTAs require Member states to form a “single customs territory, . . . so
that duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce . . . are eliminated
with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories
of the union. . . .”
A second important aspect of Article XXIV is that it sets out the basis on
which CUs and FTAs are distinguished. Article XXIV(8)(a)(ii) states that
customs unions must have a common external tariff and trade policy: Each
member state of the union must apply “substantially the same duties and
other regulations of commerce” to trade from countries that are not part of
the union. By contrast, FTAs need not meet this requirement, and thus
parties to an FTA are not obligated to harmonize their external trade policy.
20

GATS, supra note 6, art. IX(3). The most famous use of waiver practice is the Kimberly
waiver for trade in conflict diamonds. See Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or Superiority
Complex?: What to Make of the Waiver for Conflict Diamonds?, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1177
(2003). But wavier practice has also involved exceptions for regional economic integration. For
discussion, see Isabel Feichtner, The Waiver Power of the WTO: Opening the WTO for Political
Debate on the Reconciliation of Competing Interests, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 615 (2009); James
Harrison, Legal and Political Oversight of WTO Waivers, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 411 (2008).
21
We also include a discussion of how competing WTO/PTA jurisdiction works, which is
not entirely in view of Article XXIV. In future work, we will explore other legal aspects of the
WTO/PTA relationship, including the Enabling Act, GATS Article V, and waiver practice.
22
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIV(5), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter Chapeau] (stating, “the provisions of this Agreement shall not
prevent, as between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or a
free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a
customs union or of a free-trade area . . .”).
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However, both CUs and FTAs must comply with a third important aspect
of Article XXIV: The so-called “internal trade requirement” set out in Article
XXIV(8)(a)(i) and (b).23 For a CU or an FTA to be WTO-compatible, the
parties must eliminate duties and “other restrictive regulations of commerce”
“with respect to substantially all trade” among the parties to the CU or FTA.
That is, the parties must liberalize their internal trade within the PTA.
Fourth, CUs and FTAs are also required to comply with the “external
trade requirement” in Article XXIV:5. Members are permitted to form
PTAs, so long as the duties and other regulations (maintained or imposed) on
the trade of other WTO Member states “shall not on the whole be high or
more restrictive” than “prior to the formation” of the agreement.24 That is,
Member states are permitted to form CUs or FTAs so long as their agreement
does not raise trade barriers to other WTO Member states that are excluded
from the PTA.
Fifth, Article XXIV contains a notification requirement: When WTO
Member states decide to form a PTA, they are expected to notify the
GATT/WTO.25 The PTA is then to be assessed by the WTO’s Member
states, acting through an ad hoc Working Party formed to analyze the
proposed PTA (during the GATT era) or the permanent Committee on
Regional Trade Agreements (during the WTO era).
B. Ambiguities in the WTO/PTA Relationship
While Article XXIV may seem relatively straightforward when presented
in these terms, it has been continually criticized as being replete with
ambiguity.26 These ambiguities have persisted even after several attempts to
23
The terms “internal trade requirement” and “external trade requirement” are used
commonly in the legal literature on this subject. MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 24 (2003).
24
Chapeau, supra note 22.
25
The timing of the notification is undefined; Article XXIV(7)(a) merely indicates that:
Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade
area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of such a union or
area, shall promptly notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and shall make
available to them such information . . . as will enable them to make such
reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem
appropriate.
GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV(7)(a). However, the Article implies that advance notification
is necessary. See MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 23, at 349.
26
The discussion below does not cover all of the important ambiguities that scholars have
identified in the WTO/PTA relationship. Other important issues include Article XXIV’s
implications for anti-dumping, countervailing duties and safeguards, and rules of origin. See
generally Angela T. Gobbi Estrella & Gary N. Horlick, Mandatory Abolition of Anti-dumping,
Countervailing Duties and Safeguards in Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas Constituted
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find ways to clarify the requirements of Article XXIV by WTO Member
states.27
First, at a fundamental level, Article XXIV does not specify which
aspects of the GATT treaty to which it is an exception. That is, it does not
specify which WTO disciplines can be contracted out of through PTAs. The
preamble to Article XXIV(5) states that “the provisions of this Agreement
shall not prevent . . . the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area
or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a
customs union or of a free-trade area.” But which “provisions of this
Agreement” does that allow Member states to exempt themselves from
through a PTA?28 Clearly some aspects of the MFN requirement of GATT
Article I are implicated by Article XXIV, as mentioned above, but beyond
that, which aspects of the GATT are included?29 And does Article XXIV
provide an exemption for other WTO agreements beyond the GATT, such as
the TBT and SBS agreements?30 (A tentative answer would be no. As a
textual matter, “this Agreement” refers clearly to the GATT, and other
covered agreements have their own provisions that relate to the relationship
of regional integration to that agreement).31

Between WTO Members, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM
109 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006); José Antonio Rivas, Do Rules of Origin in
Free Trade Agreements Comply with Article XXIV GATT?, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 149 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006); Lockhart &
Mitchell, supra note 4.
27
These have included the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in WTO-INSTITUTIONS AND DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT (Rudiger Wolfrum et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter Understanding on Article
XXIV]; General Council, Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, WTO
Doc. WT/L/671 (Dec. 18, 2006) [hereinafter Transparency Mechanism]; and World Trade
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 19 December 2015, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(15)/DEC
(2015) [hereinafter Nairobi Declaration].
28
Mathis has argued that this issue was made more ambiguous by the Panel Report, Turkey
– Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS34/R (May 31,
1999) and Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999) rulings, which expanded which GATT
provisions could be exempted through PTAs. See James H. Mathis, Regional Trade
Agreements and Domestic Regulation: What Reach for ‘Other Restrictive Regulations of
Commerce’?, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 79 (Lorand
Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006). See also Robert Howse, Regulatory Cooperation,
Regional Trade Agreements, and World Trade Law: Conflict or Complementarity?, 78 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 140 (2015).
29
As we will see, the Panel and the Appellate Body in Turkey – Textiles clearly rejects the
idea that Article XXIV permits derogation from any GATT obligation.
30
See discussion in Lockhart & Mitchell, supra note 4; Howse, supra note 28.
31
See generally Lockhart & Mitchell, supra note 4; Mathis, supra note 28; Gabrielle
Marceau & Julian Wyatt, Dispute Settlement Regimes Intermingled: Regional Trade
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This ambiguity is exacerbated by a larger debate in the literature on the
WTO: Whether we should conceptualize the WTO as a constitutional
arrangement from which all (or little) derogation is permissible,32 or whether
the WTO is better understood as a web of bilateral agreements that Member
states are permitted to alter at will.33 Since the debate between conceptual
models of the WTO is often framed in these terms—either as a totalizing
constitutional approach that strictly limits contracting out, or as a largely
derogable agreement—it is difficult to conceptualize an appropriate limit on
which GATT/WTO obligations can be derogated from through Article
XXIV.
Second, and relatedly, is the question of whether Member states can
contract out of the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures by forming
alternative disputes settlement arrangements under PTAs. Can Member
states choose to oust the WTO’s jurisdiction to adjudicate through forum
selection clauses? What is the relationship between WTO and PTA dispute
settlement procedures and remedies?34 Article XXIV does not contemplate
this issue, and scholars have argued that it has not been satisfactorily
determined by WTO jurisprudence.35
A third ambiguity is temporal. Article XXIV specifies that it applies to
PTAs at their formation. But when should we consider a CU or FTA to be
“formed”? Are measures added subsequent to the enactment of a PTA
covered by Article XXIV?36 Many important PTAs (most notably the EU)
have been frequently amended throughout their existence, and thus an
important issue is how those subsequent amendments should be addressed
(both as a substantive and a procedural matter) by the law of the WTO (an
issue raised by the current NAFTA renegotiations). Article XXIV provides
no explicit way of dealing with a subsequent amendment.

Agreements and the WTO, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 80–81 (2010) (arguing that Turkey –
Textiles holds that any GATT discipline can be exempted through Article XXIV).
32
See sources cited supra note 13; Chios Carmody, WTO Obligations as Collective, 17
EUR. J. INT’L L. 419 (2006).
33
Joost Pauwelyn, A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations
Bilateral or Collective in Nature?, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2003).
34
See, e.g., Marceau & Wyatt, supra note 31.
35
Jennifer Hillman, Conflicts Between Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Regional Trade
Agreements and the WTO—What Should the WTO Do, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 193 (2009);
Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier, Nested and Overlapping Regimes in the Transatlantic
Banana Trade Dispute, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 362 (2006); Marc L. Busch, Overlapping
Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade, 61 INT’L ORG.
735 (2007); Debra P. Steger, The Jurisdiction of the World Trade Organization, 98 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 142, 143 (2004).
36
Lockhart & Mitchell, supra note 4, at 6.
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Fourth, several key terms in Article XXIV have long been thought to
elude definition. To take one important example, scholars have long
wondered about how to define the phrase “other restrictive regulations of
commerce” on “substantially all trade” within the internal trade requirement.
Parties to a PTA must eliminate some trade barriers within their trading bloc,
but which barriers must be removed?37 Similar language also reoccurs in
relation to the common external trade policy requirement imposed on CUs,
whereby the members of the customs union must apply “substantially the
same duties and other regulations of commerce” to those Member states who
are not party to the CU; and in the external trade requirement imposed on
CUs and FTAs, which prohibits raising trade barriers to third parties such as
that “the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed” by the CU/FTA
“shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general
incidence of the duties and regulations commerce applicable” before the
CU/FTA was formed.38 Since in some sense any difference in the regulatory
policy of two states creates a restriction on commerce (a point frequently
made by those who urge regulatory cooperation and integration), it is unclear
what degree of regulatory harmonization is mandated by the internal trade
requirement and the common external tariff requirement for a customs union,
and what degree of similarity to the prior regulatory system is imposed by
the external trade requirement.39
Finally, Article XXIV does not specify the internal WTO separation of
powers regarding PTAs—it does not specify on its face the respective roles
of the WTO’s judicial and political bodies in assessing compliance with
Article XXIV. Through the notification requirement discussed above, it
appears that the WTO Member states are meant to have a direct role in
deciding whether PTAs are Article XXIV-compliant. But what role (if any)
does this leave for the WTO’s adjudicatory bodies in assessing PTAs?40
This issue is compounded by the failure of the WTO’s Member states to
act through the ad hoc Working Parties (in the GATT era) or through the
CRTA (in the WTO era) to evaluate PTAs. During the GATT era, the
process for analyzing whether proposed PTAs were Article XXIV-complaint
was an ad hoc Working Party system. But the Working Parties were largely
ineffective, as no PTA ever notified to the GATT was judged by a Working

37

See Mathis, supra note 28.
Chapeau, supra note 22, at (a)–(b).
39
These questions are particularly relevant in the context of new PTAs where regulatory
harmonization and other non-tariff barriers are the primary focus of negotiations.
40
As discussed below, this issue was clarified by the Understanding on Article XXIV.
Similarly, the GATS clarifies the role of the WTO’s adjudicatory bodies in assessing PTAs.
38
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Party to be in violation of Article XXIV,41 and only four Working Parties
were ever able to agree on that a PTA satisfied the requirements of Article
XXIV.42
Following a call at the Singapore Ministerial Meeting in 1996 for an end
to the ad hoc Working Party Review system,43 the creation of the WTO
following the Uruguay Round ushered in a new process for responding to
PTAs notified to the WTO. The Understanding on the Interpretation of
Article XXIV mandated a Working Party review of every agreement notified
to the WTO and affirmed the need to clarify and enforce the Article.44 The
WTO General Council established the permanent Committee on Regional
Trade Agreements (CRTA) composed of all WTO Members to assess the
compatibility of the RTA with the multilateral rules.
But while the CRTA has the power to strike down a proposed CU or
FTA,45 in practice the CRTA has proved no different from the GATT
Working Parties in its ability to achieve consensus and determine whether
notified RTAs are WTO compliant, and the 2006 Transparency Mechanism
essentially phrased out Member review of the legality of PTAs altogether.46
Given this lack of effectiveness by the political/legislative aspect of the
WTO, what role remains for the WTO’s adjudicatory bodies?
Ultimately, these ambiguities in the WTO/PTA relationship have led
many scholars to conclude that Article XXIV is effectively a dead letter.47
Scholars such as Mavroidis and Pauwelyn routinely dismiss the disciplines
of Article XXIV as being irrelevant to the relationship between the regional
and multilateral trading systems.48 This has led to a relative side lining of
WTO disciplines in recent negotiations of new PTAs, including the emerging
41

ROBERTO V. FIORENTINO, LUIS VERDEJA & CHRISTELLE TOQUEBOEUF, DISCUSSION PAPER
NO. 12 THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: 2006 UPDATE (WTO
Secretariat ed., 2007).
42
BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GATT TO WTO 219 (1995). Three of these agreements were
formed prior to the examination of the EEC (the Treaty of Rome), which established a
precedent that discouraged agreement on examination; after the Treaty was accepted, almost
no agreements notified under Article XXIV were determined to have met the GATT legal
requirements. JEFFREY A. FRANKEL, REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC
SYSTEM 4 (1997).
43
MATHIS, supra note 2, at 131.
44
Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 27.
45
MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 23, at 351.
46
Transparency Mechanism, supra note 27.
47
HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 42, at 219.
48
See, e.g., Joose Pauwelyn, Legal Avenues to ‘Multilateralizing Regionalism’: Beyond
Article XXIV, in MULTILATERALIZING REGIONALISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING
SYSTEM 368, 368–69 (Richard Baldwin & Patrick Low eds., 2009) (taking as its starting point
that Article XXIV is inoperable).
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Megaregional systems. For some commentators, the multilateral system is
thought to be both an ineffective negotiating forum for achieving further
trade liberalization (as a political matter) and as irrelevant to the type of
regulatory integration that is currently being pursued at the regional level (as
a legal matter).49
III. TURKEY – TEXTILES—THE DISPUTE AND THE PANEL REPORT
The first systematic effort of the dispute settlement system to address the
interaction of PTAs with the WTO legal regime under the provisions of
GATT Article XXIV took place in the Turkey – Textiles dispute.50 While
scholars have generally concluded that the case does not fundamentally
resolve many of the important ambiguities outlined above,51 this Article will
provide a novel analysis of the case, arguing that in fact it provides important
guidance on the WTO/PTA relationship that has been confirmed in
subsequent WTO jurisprudence. This Part begins to establish this claim by
outlining the facts of the dispute and by providing an overview of the Panel’s
reasons.
A. Facts
Turkey – Textiles emerged out of a dispute between India and Turkey
regarding quantitative restrictions (QRs), or import quotas, that Turkey
imposed on imports of Indian textiles.52 Turkey was in the process of
forming a customs union with the European Union (EU), which maintained
quantitative restrictions on certain products under the relevant provisions of
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC)—including
on imported Indian textiles. To harmonize its external trade policies with the

49
The classic statement to this effect was Larry Summers’ call to pursue trade integration
through all means necessary, when multilateralism faltered. Lawrence H. Summers, Regionalism
and the World Trading System, in FED. RESERVE BANK KAN. CITY SYMP.: POL’Y IMPLICATIONS
OF TRADE AND CURRENCY ZONES (1991).
50
Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7; AB Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note
7. However, the earlier unadopted reports in the Bananas dispute did address this issue to
some extent. See MATHIS, supra note 2, ch 5.
51
This is not to say that scholars have not taken the case seriously. The case has been
subject to extensive analysis, and scholars have attempted to clarify its holdings in various
ways. We think that it is appropriate to conclude, though, that Turkey – Textiles is not thought
to provide sufficient systematic guidance on the relationship between the WTO and PTAs.
52
Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 1.1.
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EU, Turkey also imposed quantitative restrictions on imported Indian
textiles.53
India challenged Turkey’s import quotas on textiles through the WTO’s
dispute settlement procedure, arguing that they violated WTO law. India
argued that Turkey’s new quotas were a violation of Article XI of the GATT,
which prohibits quantitative restrictions, and of the ATC. Turkey responded
by arguing that Article XXIV of the GATT—and in particular the chapeau in
Article XXIV(5), which states that nothing in the GATT shall prevent the
formation of a customs union or free trade area—operated as a carve out for
measures inconsistent with GATT, when taken in the formation of customs
union. On Turkey’s approach, once it was established that certain traderestrictive measures pertained to the formation of a customs union, all such
measures must be entirely exempt from analysis under GATT disciplines.54
Turkey therefore argued that Article XXIV should be understood as a carve
out that applies to all GATT disciplines.
Turkey also addressed the internal WTO separation of powers question
discussed above: It argued that once the WTO Member states had acquiesced
to or accepted the formation of a particular custom union on the terms in
question, measures such as Turkey’s quotas that were incidental to that
formation were not justiciable by the dispute settlement organs.55 Since the
WTO’s Member states (and thus its political branch) are tasked with
considering whether a proposed PTA is compatible with Article XXIV,
Turkey denied that the WTO’s adjudicatory bodies could also have
jurisdiction.
B. The Panel Report
The Panel of first instance took a quite different approach to the meaning
of Article XXIV from the interpretation for which Turkey had argued.
Citing the Understanding on Article XXIV, the Panel found that it had the
authority to examine whether measures “arising from” the arrangements
contemplated by Article XXIV were compatible with WTO rules.56 And
taking a teleological view of Article XXIV, the Panel interpreted the role of
Article XXIV as connected to the purpose of facilitating deeper integration
53

For a discussion of why the EU was able to impose QRs on India while Turkey was not,
see AB Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 1.2.
54
Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶¶ 6.35–6.36, 9.27, 9.46, 9.88.
55
Id. ¶ 6.125.
56
Id. ¶ 9.50. The Panel was more doubtful about its authority to determine whether a
customs union actually existed in accordance with the definitional criteria in Article XXIV, an
issue that will be discussed when we come to the Appellate Body ruling in this dispute.
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and freer trade.57 Compatible with this telos was the notion that Article
XXIV, in as much as it provides relief from GATT disciplines, does so
primarily with respect to the MFN non-discrimination obligation, which is,
fundamentally, what would otherwise prevent freer trade among a subset of
WTO Members.58 The Panel then proceeded to take the position that any
deviation from WTO disciplines other than MFN in the formation of a
customs union must have an explicit basis in the text of Article XXIV (or
some other GATT exception).59
One such textual basis for deviating from the legal disciplines of the
GATT could be in the criteria that Article XXIV states must be met in order
for a particular regional arrangement to constitute a “customs union.” As
noted above, Article XXIV(8)(a)(ii) incorporates a common external trade
policy requirement into the definition of a customs union: CU members must
ensure that “substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce
are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade or territories not
included in the union.”60 Among Turkey’s arguments was that if the
harmonization of external commercial policies (as required by Article
XXIV(8)(a)(ii)) was an essential aspect of a customs union, Turkey’s CU
with the EU would not be possible unless Turkey also introduced import
quotas. That is, if Turkey was required to harmonize its external trade policy
with that of the EU to meet the definition of a CU, it should be allowed to
impose the same quotas as the EU.
A difficulty with this argument, however, is that it would also be possible
to form a Turkey-EU customs union if the EU removed its own quotas, thus
resulting in harmonization to a more liberal common external commercial
policy. To rebut this argument, Turkey relied on a particular interpretation
of the external trade requirement that, as discussed above, prohibits members
of a CU or FTA from raising barriers to trade with third parties. This
requirement states that: “[T]he duties and other regulations of commerce
imposed [on other WTO Members not part of the customs union] . . . shall
not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than [the prior] . . . duties and
regulations of commerce applicable [to WTO Members].”61 Turkey claimed
that the phrase “on the whole” in this provision allowed them room to
57

Id. ¶¶ 9.98–9.100.
Id. ¶ 9.98. That is MFN requires Member states to accord equal treatment to trade in
goods from all of their trading partners. Without a specific exception, this obligation would
prevent Member states from forming PTAs by offering some of their trading partners more
favorable terms and deeper integration than is available to the Member state’s other trading
partners.
59
Id. ¶ 9.208 (summarizing this conclusion).
60
GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV(8)(a)(ii) (the common external tariff requirement).
61
Id. art. XXIV(5)(a) (emphasis added) (the external trade requirement).
58
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maneuver, so that the new member of a customs union could introduce a
new, otherwise WTO-incompatible, restriction when harmonizing its trade
policy with other members of the customs union, as long as overall the new
duties and regulations of commerce imposed on third parties outside the CU
were not more restrictive than before.62
The Panel’s approach to Article XXIV in many respects develops out of
its rejection of this reading of the external trade requirement. For the Panel,
the external trade requirement is an additional discipline or condition on the
right to form a customs union under the WTO, and does not serve as a
justification for, or render GATT-compatible any new (otherwise GATTprohibited) restriction on trade, whether a tariff or other regulation of
commerce.63 The explicit textual evidence for the Panel’s reading, which it
cites, is Article XXIV(6), which requires that if any rate of duty is to be
increased beyond the MFN bound rate, the tariff renegotiation procedures
apply and compensatory adjustment must be provided.64 In other words,
according to the Panel, any new (otherwise GATT-prohibited) restriction
imposed at the formation of a customs union must be consistent both with the
requirement that the overall incidence of duties and regulations of commerce
be no more restrictive, and each restriction must be capable of being
rendered GATT-compatible through some explicit process or provision. But,
with respect to non-tariff measures, such as Turkey’s QRs, Article XXIV is
silent; no explicit avenue exists for rendering them compatible with the
GATT.
But is there then a conflict between the common external trade policy
requirement for customs unions on the one hand,65 and prohibitions on QRs
in the GATT on the other,66 such that Turkey would not be able to meet the
customs union requirements and therefore exercise its general right to form a
customs union without violating the provisions on QRs in the GATT? As
noted, one way of avoiding such a conflict is for the EU to liberalize its
quotas, which would avoid the need for Turkey to impose its own. However,
this would have meant that the EU would be forced to choose between
exercising specific rights it had under the ATC to impose the quotas and
exercising the right to form a customs union under the provisions of Article
XXIV.
The Panel suggests that such a result is prevented by virtue of the
language setting out the internal trade requirement in Article XXIV(8)(a)(i).
62
63
64
65
66

Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶¶ 6.33, 6.57.
Id. ¶¶ 9.121, 9.122.
GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV(6); Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 9.127.
As set out in Article XXIV(8)(a)(ii).
As set out in Article VI.
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This provision allows some restrictions between the members of a new
customs union to remain, because it only requires the members to eliminate
“substantially all” internal trade barriers—i.e., not all duties and other
restrictive regulations of commerce—when forming their customs union.67
Further, the Panel notes, the internal trade requirement refers explicitly to
internal QRs as among those measures that do not have to be entirely
removed.68 Thus, the internal trade requirement does not require the EU and
Turkey to harmonize its QRs. The EU can form a customs union with
Turkey while continuing to exercise its right to impose quotas on imports of
textiles from third countries. And the EU can prevent, through restrictions
internal to the customs union, goods in excess of the quotas entering the EU
through Turkey, without Turkey having to impose its own new QRs on third
countries.
In sum, the Panel’s approach strongly suggests that Article XXIV only
functions as a broad exception to the MFN obligation of the GATT in order
to permit preferentiality, but otherwise does not provide flexibility to deviate
from WTO rules. The Panel simply was not persuaded that deviation from
such rules would be necessary in order to form a customs union, given the
flexibility built in to the definitional criteria for a custom union.
IV. THE APPELLATE BODY’S APPROACH TO ARTICLE XXIV
The Appellate Body reached the same result as the Panel, concluding that
internal restrictions could be used as a WTO-consistent alternative to QRs in
order to harmonize the external commercial policy of Turkey and the EU.
But although the result was the same as the decision reached by the Panel,
the Appellate Body understood the architecture of Article XXIV quite
differently in several key respects. These systematic aspects of the Appellate
Body’s reasons in Turkey – Textiles have important implications for how we
understand the legal relationship between the WTO and PTAs.
A. The Necessity Test
First and most importantly, the Appellate Body focused its attention on
the preamble to Article XXIV(5), which the Appellate Body argued was key
to understanding the WTO/PTA relationship. The Appellate Body held that:

67

Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 9.150.
The internal trade requirement exempts “where necessary, those permitted under Articles
XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX).” QRs are covered by Article XI. Id.
68
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[T]he chapeau of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV is the key
provision for resolving the issue before us in this appeal . . . the
chapeau makes it clear that Article XXIV may, under certain
conditions, justify the adoption of a measure which is
inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions, and may be
invoked as a possible ‘defense’ to a finding of inconsistency.69
By focusing on the chapeau of paragraph 5, the Appellate Body was able
to articulate the steps or elements in applying the exception to a challenged
measure—what is known as the “necessity test.”
As the Appellate Body sets out, the first step in the “necessity test”
analysis is to consider whether the measure under consideration was
introduced upon the formation of a customs union.70 This implies both a
temporal and a substantive dimension: The party invoking Article XXIV as a
defense must demonstrate that the arrangement “fully meets the requirements
[for a customs union set out in] sub-paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a)” of Article
XXIV.71
Next, the second step is to determine whether the challenged measure is
GATT-inconsistent “only to the extent” necessary to allow the possibility of
the formation of a customs union.72 In this second step, according to the
Appellate Body, it is necessary to deploy the definition of a customs union
set out in Article XXIV(8): The key question is to whether the challenged
measure’s deviation from GATT rules is indispensable—i.e., logically
required—for the PTA under consideration to acquire all the defining
features of a customs union.
Third and finally, the Appellate Body set out, the CU must meet the
external trade requirement: that, with respect to third countries, the “general
incidence” of duties not be higher than that applied by the individual
members prior to the customs union, and that the “general incidence” of
“other regulations of commerce” not be more restrictive.73
B. Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and the WTO’s Internal Separation of Powers
In setting out this three-step necessity test, the Appellate Body’s decision
differs in an important way from the approach taken by the Panel in Turkey –
Textiles. The Panel was uncertain whether it had the jurisdiction to
69
70
71
72
73

AB Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶¶ 43, 45.
Id. ¶ 45.
Id. ¶ 58.
Id. ¶ 46.
Id. ¶ 54.
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determine whether the arrangement between the EU and Turkey met all the
requirements of a customs union; it proceeded, exercising judicial economy,
on the basis that even if the arrangement did meet those requirements,
Turkey’s deviation from GATT rules would not be justifiable under Article
XXIV.74 While this aspect of the Panel ruling was not appealed, and the
Appellate Body made no direct judgment on whether in fact the EU-Turkey
arrangement qualified as a customs union, the AB noted that “it may not
always be possible to determine whether or not applying a measure would
prevent the formation of a customs union [i.e., step 2 of the necessity test]
without first determining whether there is a customs union [i.e. step 1 of the
necessity test].”75 The Appellate Body thus clearly sees the dispute
settlement organs as having the jurisdictional competence to directly assess
whether a particular measure meets the requirements of a customs union that
are set out in Article XXIV.
In deviating from the Panel and suggesting that the dispute settlement
organs might have the competence and even the responsibility in certain
cases to determine whether the general requirements for a customs union or
free trade area had been fulfilled, the Appellate Body attracted considerable
controversy.76 GATT practice was understood by many to be that proposed
PTAs, or those in the process of formation, would be notified to the
membership, discussed in the relevant Committee, and ultimately voted on
for its compatibility with Article XXIV.77
Yet the Appellate Body’s assertion of jurisdiction is consistent with both
the law and practice of the GATT/WTO. While Article XXIV establishes
procedures for notification of new PTAs to the membership, and the
possibility of the membership making “recommendations” in light of the
examination of the PTA in the appropriate committee, there is no
requirement that the membership make an actual determination as to whether
a PTA is consistent with Article XXIV. In addition, the committees’
consensus-based decision-making practice means that it would be very
unlikely to have a situation where through “recommendations” the
Membership makes a negative finding of the inconsistency of a notified PTA
with Article XXIV, given that the members of the PTA would have to vote

74

Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 9.54.
AB Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 59.
76
Now, however, that the Transparency Mechanism has clarified that the WTO’s judicial
bodies have this power. Transparency Mechanism, supra note 27.
77
PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 312 (2015).
75
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against themselves as part of the consensus.78 This has been born out in
practice, where the ad hoc Working Parties of the GATT era and the CRTA
of the WTO era have not been able to come to any consensus on whether
PTAs comply with the requirements of Article XXIV.79 The Uruguay Round
Understanding on Article XXIV strongly suggests that the function of
notification requirements and discussion of new PTAs in the CRTA is now
understood largely as transparency or information-exchange (rather than
determining compliance).80 The Understanding gives an explicit role to the
dispute settlement system with respect to application of Article XXIV, and
notes the need to develop good economic evidence that allows application of
the criteria in Article XXIV.81 But it does nothing to enhance any decisionmaking authority of the membership, or in particular, the CRTA. The 2006
Transparency Mechanism goes even further in the direction of structuring the
consideration of PTAs in the CRTA as merely an exchange of information.82
These emerging practices suggest that the Appellate Body was correct to
assert jurisdiction over PTAs in Turkey – Textiles.
Indeed, the absence of action by the WTO’s political organs to judge
compliance with Article XXIV could be considered a kind of subsequent
state practice, within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, Article 31.83 Perhaps this state practice means that the WTO
treaties have evolved regarding their internal separation of powers on which
bodies have the jurisdiction to determine whether a PTA complies with
Article XXIV,84 an interpretation which would affirm the approach taken by
the Appellate Body in Turkey – Textiles. At the same time, the Appellate
Body’s approach does not negate political control over Article XXIV
matters, as there remain avenues for states to exercise ultimate political
control over the requirements of Article XXIV.85

78

Petros Mavroidis, If I don’t Do It, Somebody Else Will (Or Won’t): Testing the
Compliance of Preferential Trade Agreements with the Multilateral Rules, J. WORLD TRADE
187, 187 (2006).
79
Id.
80
Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 27.
81
Id.
82
Transparency Mechanism, supra note 27.
83
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 [hereinafter VCLT].
84
Indeed, perhaps one could make an even stronger version of this argument: Perhaps a
WTO Member would be estopped from arguing before the dispute settlement organs that a
PTA does not meet the general requirements of Article XXIV if the Member had not
previously raised the issue when the PTA is considered by the Committee.
85
Article XXIV itself notably provides for the possibility of a waiver, where an
arrangement is non-conforming, and the general waiver provisions have been invoked in many
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This approach is also consistent with our “pluralist” interpretation of
WTO law, which highlights the need for the WTO’s adjudicatory bodies to
act to decide disputes that establish the boundaries of state authority under
WTO law.86 While we have argued that the WTO’s disciplines should be
read in a way that protects states’ right to regulate, this implies jurisdiction
for the WTO’s dispute settlement bodies over matters that set out the scope
of states’ policy space and regulatory autonomy—a matter that, as we argue
below, is implicated by the requirements of Article XXIV.
C. The “Formation” of a PTA
A third important implication of the Appellate Body’s ruling relates to
what it means to “form” a CU or a FTA. Recall that an important debate
regarding Article XXIV is how to understand what it means—both
temporally and substantively—to form a CU or an FTA.87 While the Panel
had noted that Article XXIV does not define the “concept” of formation,88
the Appellate Body emphasizes the importance of understanding what
“formation” means, because the Article XXIV defense applies only to
measures introduced at the “formation” of a customs union.89 CUs and FTAs
are often changed by parties subsequent to their formation; are these changes
non-justiciable?
The Appellate Body’s articulation of the necessity test suggests that
preferential removal of restrictions by members of a customs union
subsequent to “formation” could not be justified as a departure from MFN
under Article XXIV, since each departure must be subject to the analysis
they outline.90 In addition, the fact that their approach allows an arrangement
to qualify as a customs union where some trade is still not liberalized and
some commercial policies are still not harmonized suggests that a customs
union may still be in a process of formation even after it passes the
definitional threshold. It may therefore be appropriate to view “formation” as
an ongoing process.
This approach would be consistent with what both the Panel and the
Appellate Body agree is the purpose of Article XXIV: to facilitate more

cases where preferential arrangements (such as the Lome Convention) did not conform either
to the requirements of Article XXIV (or the Enabling Clause MFN exception).
86
Howse, supra note 15; Howse & Langille, Permitting Pluralism, supra note 12.
87
See supra Part II.B.
88
Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 9.133.
89
AB Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 46.
90
Given the Appellate Body’s emphasis on justiciability and the application of the
necessity test to any departure.
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liberalization or deeper integration.91 If a PTA is only subject to scrutiny at
the initial moment of formation and not on an ongoing basis, this would
encourage parties to alter the terms of their PTAs after their initial formation,
in order to adopt new measures that did not comply with the liberalizing
requirements of Article XXIV. This approach is also consistent with the
judiciary’s role under a pluralist conception of WTO law, where the DSM
must play an important role in ensuring that the law of the WTO pursues a
certain conception of liberalism—and if that objective could only be pursued
at the initial formation of an agreement, the WTO’s adjudicatory bodies
would be unable to play this important monitoring role on an ongoing basis.
D. “Other Regulations of Commerce”
In their analysis of Turkey’s import quotas, both the Panel and the
Appellate Body had no difficulty concluding that QRs constitute “other
regulations of commerce” that must be harmonized in accordance with the
common external trade policy requirement for customs unions. When
reaching this conclusion, the Panel took an extremely broad approach to
defining “other regulations of commerce.” They held that:
[T]he ordinary meaning of the terms “other regulations of
commerce” could be understood to include any regulation
having an impact (such as measures in the fields covered by
WTO rules, e.g. sanitary and phytosanitary, customs valuation,
anti-dumping, technical barriers to trade; as well as any other
trade related domestic regulation, e.g. environmental standards,
export credit schemes).92
In responding to the Panel’s finding, the Appellate Body made no explicit
effort to directly identify the scope of “other regulations of commerce.”
However, it did cite the Understanding on Article XXIV to the effect that
“quantification and aggregation of regulations of commerce other than duties
may be difficult.”93 This statement seems to presuppose that the Appellate
Body had in mind some definition of “regulations of commerce” other than
duties, but no explicit definition is to be found, either in Article XXIV itself

91
Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶¶ 9.98–9.100; AB Report, Turkey –
Textiles, supra note 7, ¶¶ 56–57.
92
Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 9.121.
93
AB Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 54.
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or in the Understanding.94 Can the Appellate Body’s reference be parsed, in
order to set out an appropriate account of “other regulations of commerce”?
We can begin by considering whether the Appellate Body would have
accepted the Panel’s broad approach. To assess the normative and practical
consequences of such a broad and dynamic definition of “other regulations of
commerce,” we need to look closely at the role of this expression in Article
XXIV. It appears three times within the text of the article. First, the internal
trade requirement states that in both a customs union and a free trade area,
“other restrictive regulations of commerce . . . are eliminated with respect to
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories.”95 Secondly,
the external trade requirement, which also applies to both customs unions
and free trade areas, provides that “other regulations of commerce” imposed
on trade with third countries “shall not on the whole be higher or more
restrictive than the general incidence” prior to the establishment of the
customs union or FTA.96 And third, the common external trade policy
requirement for customs unions states that “substantially the same duties and
other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the
union” to third countries.97
One immediately observes that in both the internal and external trade
requirements, the expression “other regulations of commerce” is used in
conjunction with the adjective “restrictive.” This suggests that “other
regulations of commerce” are measures of which the trade restrictive
character is readily identifiable, even if, as the Understanding acknowledges,
they are difficult to quantify or aggregate in some cases.98 These would
include not only quantitative restrictions, but also various kinds of
requirements and norms that are clearly and explicitly related to border
restrictions (such as rules of origin, customs formalities, valuation, etc.).
Furthermore, the internal trade requirement exempts from the requirement
of elimination “regulations of commerce” permitted under various
exceptions in the GATT, and refers in particular to those in Articles XI, XII,
XIII, XIV, XV and XX. Articles XI-XV all deal with border restrictions
that take a form other than tariffs. Notably there is no reference to “other
regulations of commerce” permitted under Article III National Treatment,99
which has exceptions of its own, or even under Articles V and VI, which

94
95
96
97
98
99

See supra Part II.B.
GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV(8)(a)(i), (b) (emphasis added).
Id. art. XXIV(5) (emphasis added).
Id. art. XXIV(8)(a)(ii).
Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 27.
GATT, supra note 3, art. III.
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deal with dumping and subsidies.100 These textual considerations suggest a
much narrower scope in the meaning of “other regulations of commerce”
than the Panel’s broad and dynamic conception of “any regulation having an
impact on trade.”
In addition, the normative and practical consequences of the Panel’s
proposed definition suggest that the text of Article XXIV contains a narrower
conception of “other regulations of commerce.” Under the right to regulate
that the Appellate Body has identified as a central tenet of the WTO
system,101 WTO Members have a right to maintain regulations having an
impact on trade, even those that have trade-restrictive aspects, provided that
they are not unnecessary and/or discriminatory obstacles to trade.102 Few
countries, if any, and understandably so, would commit to an agenda for
customs union or FTA negotiations that entails the elimination of
substantially all regulations that have some restrictive impact on trade.103 To
the extent that they impose some requirements or standards on traded
products, essentially all regulations have trade-restrictive effects. Indeed, no
actual FTA or customs union, not even the EU, comes close to eliminating
substantially all regulations that have an element or potential element of
trade-restrictiveness.
In addition, we can consider the history of Article XXIV when parsing
the meaning of “other regulations of commerce.” The drafters of Article
XXIV had in mind the kinds of regulations of commerce that it was
appropriate to eliminate for the sake of free or freer trade, such as protective
border restrictions. But they did not contemplate eliminating internal
regulations, that might be the subject of tighter disciplines in FTAs or
customs unions (such as best regulatory practices, transparency, or
cooperation requirements) but which are not to be eliminated because they
serve essential public policy purposes—even if their trade-restrictiveness is
to be reduced to that which is unavoidable, perhaps through regulatory
rapprochement or harmonization. In light of the purpose of Article XXIV—
the facilitation of freer trade—it would make little sense if Article XXIV
imposed requirements with respect to internal regulations that are largely
irreconcilable with almost any country’s notion of its sovereignty, meaning

100
Id. arts. V, VI. Neither in the Can.-U.S. FTA nor under the NAFTA has the use of antidumping and countervailing duties between the parties been constrained substantively beyond
the limits in the WTO Agreements.
101
See, e.g., China – Publications, supra note 14, ¶ 222.
102
As we have argued in prior work. See Howse & Langille, Permitting Pluralism, supra
note 12, at 432; Howse et al., Pluralism in Practice, supra note 12, at 91.
103
This point is made by Mathis in interpreting the ORC and ORRC language in Article
XXIV. Mathis, supra note 28, at 91. See also Howse, supra note 28, at 142.
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that the ability of WTO Members to reduce clearly protectionist, restrictive
border measures through PTAs and in a manner consistent with WTO law
would be held hostage to a requirement of surrender of regulatory
sovereignty that, realistically, no state could be expected to accept acrossthe-board.
The Panel’s definition would mean that, in the case of a CU, almost all
trade-impacting domestic regulations would have to be harmonized. The
customs union would have to be able to exercise competence over all areas
of domestic regulation with an impact or potential impact on trade, powers
far greater than even those that the EU authorities exercise. This clearly
contradicts the conception of pluralism on which, in other work, we have
argued the WTO legal system is grounded.104 Moreover, in the case of
customs unions, if one takes the harmonization requirement along with the
requirement that after the formation of the customs union the general
incidence of regulations cannot on the whole be higher or more restrictive
(the external trade requirement), then on the Panel’s definition of “other
regulations of commerce,” harmonization upward (towards the standards
maintained by the strictest regulator among the members of the CU) would
be rendered well-nigh impossible, because ratcheting up regulatory standards
would almost of necessity result in overall higher or more restrictive
regulations than prior to the CU.105
For these reasons, we argue that the Panel’s wide-ranging approach
would not have been accepted by the Appellate Body if it had directly
addressed the meaning of “other regulations of commerce.” Instead, we will
propose a more limited understanding of the term that is more consistent
with our pluralist approach.
E. Article XXIV and Regulatory Discrimination
As discussed above in Part II.B, an essential debate about the meaning of
Article XXIV concerns the extent to which WTO non-discrimination
obligations be contracted out of through PTAs. Scholars have often assumed
that home country regulation or mutual recognition approaches that may
exist in customs unions or FTAs, where imported products are accepted into
another Member of the arrangement on the basis that they meet the
104
See Howse & Langille, Permitting Pluralism, supra note 12; Howse et al., Pluralism in
Practice, supra note 12.
105
For a discussion of the so-called “California Effect”—the idea that economic integration
may lead to the ratcheting up of regulatory standards—see Richard Perkins & Eric Neumayer,
Does the ‘California Effect’ Operate Across Borders? Trading- and Investing-up in Automobile
Emission Standards, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 217 (2012).
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regulatory standards of the Member exporting them, are compatible with
Article XXIV.106 That is, scholars assume that the MFN exemption that
enables the elimination of tariffs and other border restrictions such as QRs,
also applies to preferential regulatory treatment of goods originating in other
members of the customs union or FTA. In our view, however, the Appellate
Body Report in Turkey – Textiles calls this assumption into question.
Contrary to the Panel’s notion that Article XXIV operates as a broad
exemption from MFN to enable preferentiality in customs unions and FTAs
(while offering no flexibility to deviate from other WTO obligations), the
Appellate Body determined instead that the defense or exception in Article
XXIV operates much like, for example, the Article XX defense or
exception.107 The party invoking the exception regardless of what WTO
obligation is involved must show that it is impossible to form a customs
union or FTA unless the parties can deviate from a particular obligation.108
The parties must prove in each instance that the deviation from WTO
obligations is logically necessary to form the customs union or FTA.
In practice, of course, it would be relatively easy to invoke the exception
to justify preferential elimination of tariffs and other border measures, given
Article XXVI’s definition of a CU or FTA. However, given our
understanding of the term “other regulations of commerce,” we see it as
questionable as to whether home country-regulation, mutual recognition
agreements, or other discriminatory approaches to regulatory standards
which favor products produced under a regulatory regime within the customs
union or FTA are logically necessary for the formation of a customs union.109
One could meet the definition of a customs union or FTA under Article
XXIV by eliminating internal tariffs and other border restrictions (and in the
case of a customs union, harmonizing external commercial policies, as
opposed to other sorts of regulatory policies), without in any way needing to
create a “regulatory fortress.”
Furthermore, while allowing departure from MFN to facilitate elimination
of tariffs and QRs among the members of the customs union or FTA clearly
serves the purpose the Panel and Appellate Body identify as informing all of
Article XXIV—which is to promote freer, less restrictive trade—regulatory
understandings that discriminate against products from third countries do not
as such make trade freer. Indeed, giving some kind of preference to products
produced under the regulatory standards of a member of the customs union
or FTA arguably has the potential to introduce a new barrier to goods from
106
107
108
109

See Howse, supra note 28.
AB Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶¶ 52, 57.
Id. ¶ 58.
As required by the necessity test set out by the Appellate Body in Turkey – Textiles.
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third countries, a kind of regulatory cartel. Regulatory discrimination may in
fact be designed to facilitate the creation of regulatory requirements or
standards that in effect shut out non-member third countries. It makes little
sense, in terms of the avoidance of PTAs resulting in new restrictions of
trade, to altogether remove such arrangements from examination under the
MFN discipline.110
This claim is reinforced by the fact that the SPS and TBT Agreements do
not provide any kind of carve out or exception from their own MFN
obligations for PTAs.111 Nor can it reasonably be argued that Article XXIV
itself is now extended, post-Uruguay Round, to SPS and TBT. The Uruguay
Round Understanding on Article XXIV contains no such extension, and the
WTO Appellate Body has stated that that GATT exceptions do not apply to
the TBT Agreement.112 In fact, when one examines the provisions of SPS
and TBT, they seem designed to avoid discriminatory regional arrangements,
suggesting that mechanisms like mutual recognition agreements should be
open to all WTO Members who are able to satisfy the objective regulatory
criteria, and that regulations should be based on standards enacted by
standardization bodies that are inclusive, open to participation by the
standardization authorities of all WTO Members.113
We stress that the implication of our analysis is not that the emphasis on
regulatory matters in newer PTAs needs to be shut down in order to make
PTAs compliant with Article XXIV (a highly unrealistic proposition); rather,
whatever regulatory arrangements exist regionally under PTAs must be open
to WTO Members who are not in the PTA on non-discriminatory terms,
provided they and their products conform to the objective criteria in
question.

110
Bernard Hoekman & Petros Mavroidis, WTO ‘a la carte’ or ‘menu du jour’? Assessing
the Case for More Plurilateral Agreements, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 319, 324 (2015).
111
There is bilateral mutual recognition, but this is not intended to be discriminatory.
Indeed, TBT and SPS both include articles regarding conformity to international standards,
which suggests that any regulatory standards must be open for other parties to join and should
comply with an international/multilateral approach where possible. See, e.g., Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade arts. 2.4, 2.6, Jan. 1, 1995, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT
Agreement].
112
See Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale
of Clove Cigarettes, ¶¶ 95–96, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter US –
Clove Cigarettes].
113
See also on this point, Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R
(May 16, 2012) [hereinafter Tuna – Dolphin II]; Howse, supra note 28, at 137–51.
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How MFN can operate to ensure that regulation is non-discriminatory is
well-illustrated by EEC – Beef.114 In that case, Europe had conditioned
preferential access for certain beef imports on their quality certification by
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).115 Canada brought a
complaint before a GATT Panel, arguing this stipulation violated the MFN
provision because it gave advantageous treatment to beef imports from the
United States, which were in fact the only products certified by the USDA to
the quality standard in question.116 Canada stated it could provide evidence
that its beef was of equivalent quality,117 and the Panel found an MFN
violation to the extent that Canadian beef of equivalent quality was excluded
by virtue of the arrangement based on USDA certification.118
The lesson for PTAs is they should be operated like open plurilateral
agreements dealing with regulatory issues. In our interpretation of Article
XXIV, all WTO Members and their products should be able to participate on
a non-discriminatory basis, provided that objective criteria are satisfied.
This circumscribed understanding of which aspects of the nondiscrimination obligation can be avoided through the formation of a PTA is
also in line with our general pluralist approach to interpreting the law of the
WTO. As noted above, this approach preserves individual states’ regulatory
autonomy by not making regulatory coherence or integration a mandatory
aspect of the formation of a PTA.119 While it permits states to form new
sources of legal authority through forming PTAs, it also ensures that states
retain their ability to regulate for reasons that they consider to be important;
they do not need to pursue regulatory integration to exercise their right to
form a PTA. The idea that PTA regulatory regimes should remain open to
outsiders’ approaches also increases the regulatory options available to states
who are not party to a PTA. They do not need to join the PTA to have their
regulatory approach recognized as equal, allowing them to preserve their
regulatory autonomy. Finally, this approach also reduces opportunities for
group-based protectionism and discriminatory behavior, which is (generally)
the type of liberalization about which we are concerned.

114
Panel Report, European Economic Community – Imports of Beef from Canada, L/509928S/92 (Mar. 10, 1981).
115
Id. at 2.
116
Id. at 3.
117
Id. at 2.
118
Id. at 5.
119
See supra note 12. This is particularly important in the context of developing countrydeveloped country RTAs, given the extraordinary inequality in bargaining power.
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F. Affirming the Appellate Body’s Approach: Article XXIV as a Lex
Specialis or Quasi-Constitutional Norm of the WTO System in Peru –
Agricultural Products
After Turkey – Textiles, some commentators speculated that the activation
by the Appellate Body of Article XXIV as a “hard law” framework for
disciplining the departure of PTAs from GATT norms would have little
significance, as WTO Members would still be reluctant to litigate matters
concerning PTAs in the WTO dispute system. Many commentators still
consider Article XXIV to be a dead letter, and in that sense conclude that
Turkey – Textiles has not altered the institutional context in which Article
XXIV issues are resolved.
Given this standard picture of Article XXIV’s legal force, it is worth
noting that the Appellate Body reinforced the centrality of the Article XXIV
framework in the subsequent Peru – Agricultural Products case.120 In that
case, Guatemala challenged a variable pricing mechanism that Peru operated
for certain agricultural products under the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture.121 One of Peru’s responses to this challenge was that in a PTA
negotiated but not ratified by Guatemala and Peru, there was an explicit
clause allowing the maintenance of such a variable price mechanism; Peru
argued that this was a case where, in conformity with Article 41 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a subset of parties to a
multilateral treaty (here the WTO Agreements) modified the obligations of
the treaty as applicable between themselves through a PTA.122 While not
really resolving whether the PTA actually did purport to modify WTO
obligations, or what should be significance of non-ratification of the PTA,
the Appellate Body made this broad jurisprudential determination:
[W]e note that the WTO agreements contain specific
provisions addressing amendments, waivers, or exceptions for
regional trade agreements, which prevail over the general
provisions of the Vienna Convention, such as Article 41. This
is particularly true in the case of FTAs considering that Article
XXIV of the GATT 1994 specifically permits departures from
certain WTO rules in FTAs.
However, Article XXIV
conditions such departures on the fulfilment of the rule that the
120

See generally Appellate Body Report, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain
Agricultural Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS457/AB/R (July 20, 2015) [hereinafter AB Report,
Peru – Agricultural Products].
121
Id. at 8.
122
Id. ¶ 5.85; VCLT, supra note 83, art. 41.
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level of duties and other regulations of commerce, applicable in
each of the FTA members to the trade of non-FTA members,
shall not be higher or more restrictive than those applicable
prior to the formation of the FTA.
In the light of the above, we consider that the proper routes
to assess whether a provision in an FTA that may depart from
certain WTO rules is nevertheless consistent with the covered
agreements are the WTO provisions that permit the formation
of regional trade agreements . . . namely: [Article XXIV, the
Enabling Clause, and GATS Article V].123
The Appellate Body is in effect stating here that, even where trade with
other WTO Members is unaffected, any attempt by two or more Members to
modify WTO obligations among themselves must pass through the relevant
WTO legal architecture that deals with changes to obligations, whether
Article XXIV (for trade in goods), the Enabling Clause (for developing
country trade), or GATS Article V (for trade in services). This arguably goes
beyond the obvious purpose of ensuring that PTAs do not lead to more
restrictive trade with third countries, or to ensuring that they in general result
in freer trade, to assuring the unity and integrity of the WTO as a legal
system. Preferential elimination of border restrictions is obviously tolerated
to allow for freer trade, but other departures are subject to a high level of
scrutiny or perhaps are largely impermissible except by waiver. Here, the
Appellate Body adopts an approach to preserve the relative autonomy and
universality of a multilateral regime under pressure from “spaghetti-bowl”
fragmentation.124
V. FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, CUSTOMS UNIONS, AND JURISDICTION TO
ADJUDICATE AT THE WTO
While Article XXIV, as interpreted in Turkey – Textiles and Peru –
Agricultural Products, is the cornerstone for the legal interface between
WTO law and PTAs, another jurisprudential edifice on this matter has been
built up in parallel through disputes in the WTO about how PTAs affect the
jurisdiction of the WTO’s dispute settlement organs. The most obvious issue

123

AB Report, Peru – Agricultural Products, supra note 120, ¶¶ 5.112–5.113 (internal
citations omitted).
124
In Bhagwati’s well-known terminology.
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arises where a similar or identical claim has been brought in a PTA forum
and in the WTO: Are such parallel proceedings compatible with the DSU?125
Since there is considerable overlap in coverage between many FTA and
WTO provisions and FTAs frequently cite or even incorporate large swaths
of WTO law,126 a legally and/or factually identical dispute might be brought
under either or both a FTA or in WTO dispute settlement. At first glance,
one might think that the language of DSU Article 23 solves this problem, as
it states that Members undertake to settle disputes “under the covered
agreements” in accordance with the DSU.127 But this only grants the WTO’s
DSM jurisdiction over disputes related to the substance of the covered
agreements—it does not explicitly state that the WTO’s DSM is
hierarchically superior to those of FTAs/CUs. And as a matter of general
international law, there is no prohibition on parallel proceedings, and
regional and international tribunals have frequently found themselves
deciding or opining on what could be considered aspects of the same
situation or the same legal problem.128
However, some PTAs have directly addressed this issue by stating that
where a dispute may be brought either at the WTO or in the regional forum
that the claimant must choose the latter.129 The question that has arisen in
the case law has thus been whether such a choice of forum provision is
consistent with the spirit of Article 23 of the DSU.
For example, this issue arose in the Tuna – Dolphin II dispute. In that
case, Mexico brought a dispute with the U.S. (its NAFTA partner) to the
WTO, even though the choice of forum clause in the NAFTA indicated that
environmental disputes (like the claim Mexico was bringing) were to be
decided in the NAFTA forum.130 The United States raised this issue when
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) was dealing with the request for a WTO

125
See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 35; Songling Yang, The Solution for Jurisdictional Conflicts
Between the WTO and RTAs: The Forum Choice Clause, 23 MICH. ST. L. REV. 107 (2014).
126
For a recent survey, see Todd Allee, Manfred Elsig & Andrew Lugg, The Ties Between
the World Trade Organization and Preferential Trade Agreements: A Textual Analysis, 20 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 333 (2017).
127
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3.2, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm [hereinafter DSU].
128
See generally YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS (2003); Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Cross-Judging: Tribunalization in a
Fragmented but Interconnected Global Order, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 959 (2009).
129
North American Free Trade Agreement art. 2020, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993).
130
See Tuna – Dolphin II, supra note 113.
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panel;131 however, a Panel was struck despite the United States’ concern that
Mexico was in breach of the choice of forum provision in the NAFTA.132
Crucially, though, the United States did not actually argue before the
Panel itself that it should refrain from taking jurisdiction.133 This was likely
because, absent any general doctrine of international law that might be
applicable to the situation in question, there does not seem to be a strong
textual basis in the DSU for panels to refuse jurisdiction on the grounds that
the claim has been brought in violation of the complaining Member’s
obligations under another international agreement.
Attempts by defending Members to challenge jurisdiction in these types
of cases have thus focused on notions such as good faith (which is explicitly
incorporated into the DSU),134 as well as the concept of estoppel.135
However, as we explore below, Panels and the Appellate Body have never
fully accepted any of these arguments—although they have also not
explicitly concluded that an agreement between two or more WTO Members
could never be the basis for a panel to decline jurisdiction. Instead, the
Panels and the Appellate Body have left open the possibility that there might
be a valid claim against jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement if the
parties both accept a clear, unambiguous, binding agreement to opt out of
WTO dispute settlement.
A. Argentina – Poultry
The first case where the issue of the impact of an FTA or customs union
on jurisdiction was before a WTO Panel was the Argentina – Poultry
dispute.136 In that case, Brazil had already challenged the anti-dumping
measure at issue in proceedings in MERCOSUR.137 Argentina argued that
the WTO Panel should decline jurisdiction on the grounds that Brazil, given
its actions in MERCOSUR, should be estopped from bringing a claim
131
See Simon Lester, The Tuna-Dolphin Case: The NAFTA WTO Conflict Heats Up, INT’L
ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Nov. 5, 2009), http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2009/11/t
he-tunadolphin-case-the-naftawto-conflict-heats-up.html; Simon Lester, Mexico and the U.S.
Discuss the NAFTA/WTO Overlap, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Aug. 17, 2009), http://wor
ldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2009/08/mexico-and-the-us-discuss-the-naftawto-overlap.
html; Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on
20 April 2009, at 16–17, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M267 (June 26, 2009).
132
See Tuna – Dolphin II, supra note 113.
133
See id. at 53.
134
DSU, supra note 127, art. 3.10.
135
See supra notes 126–34 and accompanying text.
136
Panel Report, Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil, 1727,
WTO Doc. WT/DS241/R (Apr. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Panel Report, Argentina – Poultry].
137
Id. ¶ 2.19.
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against the same measure before a WTO Panel.138 Argentina argued that the
jurisdiction of the WTO Panel should be conditioned on estoppel as a general
principle of international law (and not that this estoppel principle was
contained in any particular provision of the text of the DSU itself).139
Argentina also invoked, in relation to estoppel, the principle of good faith.140
Brazil countered that, even if the measure was the same, the legal issues
raised in the WTO proceedings were different from those before the
MERCOSUR tribunal.141
Regarding the good faith claim, the Panel followed the reasoning of the
Appellate Body in the prior Byrd Amendment case, holding that for there to
be a breach of good faith there would need to be a breach of some provision
of the covered agreements and something more (e.g., an egregious breach).142
Given that in Argentina – Poultry, Argentina was not alleging that there was
any breach of any DSU provision, let alone an egregious breach, this
argument did not succeed.143
The Panel’s disposition of the estoppel argument hinged critically upon
the Protocol of Olivos, a MERCOSUR instrument not yet in force between
the parties.144 Under the Protocol, a state party is required to make an
exclusive choice of dispute forum.145 Thus, if MERCOSUR is chosen as the
forum, the state party would be precluded from bringing proceedings in
another forum such as the WTO. The Panel noted that Brazil had not made
any explicit statement on which Argentina might have relied regarding not
bringing further proceedings in the WTO. According to the Panel, the fact
that the Protocol of Olivos was not yet in force (and that its predecessor
instrument did not require exclusivity in choice of forum) further
strengthened the notion that there was no reasonable basis for Argentina to
rely on Brazil’s MERCOSUR claim as an undertaking not to bring
proceedings in the WTO.146
With respect to the estoppel claim, the Panel expressed no explicit view
as to whether the principle of estoppel could ever be applied to defeat the
jurisdiction of a WTO Panel. The Panel simply found that Argentina had not
met the conditions Argentina itself asserted would have to be present to
establish an estoppel, including a clear statement or undertaking that induces
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

Id. ¶¶ 7.65, 7.67.
Id. ¶ 7.18.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7.22.
Id. ¶ 7.35.
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reliance.147 The Panel also rejected Argentina’s argument in the alternative.
Argentina claimed that should the Panel decide to accept jurisdiction, the
findings of the MERCOSUR tribunal ought to be considered res judicata, as
a matter of the application of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, which requires that other relevant rules of international
law applicable between the parties be taken into account in interpreting the
treaty in question (here the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement). The Panel
noted that, in fact, Argentina had not specified any particular interpretation
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement that was supported by MERCOSUR law.
The Panel further observed: “We note we are not even bound to follow
rulings contained in adopted WTO panel reports, so we see no reason at all
why we should be bound by the rulings of non-WTO dispute settlement
bodies.”148
The Argentina – Poultry Panel Report was not appealed. However, in a
subsequent case, EC – Sugar,149 where similar estoppel and good faith
arguments were raised to claim that the Panel should decline jurisdiction,150
the Appellate Body held that “to the extent that this concept applies at all, it
is reasonable for a panel to examine estoppel in the context of determining
whether a Member has engaged ‘in these procedures in good faith’, as
required under Article 3.10 of the DSU.”151 In EC – Sugar, the issue had
nothing to do with proceedings in a different forum; the EC instead was
asserting an implicit understanding among WTO Members that, despite a
technical scheduling error, its sugar regime was insulated from challenge in
WTO dispute settlement. In response, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s
findings that on the facts the assertions of estoppel and bad faith by the EU
could not be sustained; the Appellate Body held that there was simply no
explicit statement on the basis of which the reliance of the EU on the nonchallenge of these measures could be founded. Overall, the language of the
Appellate Body, while not entirely closing the door to estoppel-like
considerations being relevant to good faith under DSU 3.10, suggested
considerable skepticism as to whether such an objection to Panel jurisdiction
would ever prevail.

147

Id. ¶ 7.39.
Id. ¶ 7.41.
149
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar, 6365, WTO
Docs. WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R (May 19, 2005) [hereinafter AB
Report, EC – Sugar].
150
Id.
151
Id. ¶ 307.
148
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B. Peru – Agricultural Products
In Peru – Agricultural Products,152 the arguments about good faith and
estoppel were again raised in relation to the provision of an FTA, where Peru
claimed it had been agreed that a price band mechanism could be maintained
notwithstanding WTO law. As in the situation with the Protocol of Olivos in
the Argentina – Poultry dispute, the relevant FTA had not yet entered into
force.153 As a matter of judicial economy, the Appellate Body might have
relied on this fact to dismiss Peru’s estoppel and good faith claims, on the
basis that a commitment in a treaty not yet in force is incapable of setting up
the requisite reliance interest (even assuming that estoppel could be a basis
for defeating the jurisdiction of a WTO Panel). Instead, the Appellate Body
took the opportunity to elaborate on the approach it had sketched in EC –
Sugar.
The Panel in Peru – Agricultural Products had begun from the
proposition that its terms of reference, which were to make findings or
rulings with respect to relevant provisions of the covered agreements,
excluded any consideration of non-WTO international law unless “based on
a relevant provision of the covered agreements that has been invoked by one
of the parties to the dispute.”154 Thus, in this instance, the point of departure
was articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU, and the concept of “good faith.” While
relying on the Appellate Body’s approach to good faith in EC – Sugar, the
Panel also drew from a different Appellate Body decision in the Bananas III
dispute.155 The question there concerned the status of a negotiated settlement
of part of the dispute between the litigants, and whether such a negotiated
settlement precluded further WTO dispute settlement proceedings under
DSU 21.5. The Appellate Body held that “the complainants could be
precluded from initiating Article 21.5 proceedings by means of these
Understandings only if the parties to these Understandings had, either
explicitly or by necessary implication, agreed to waive their right to have
recourse [to WTO dispute settlement].”156 In other words, the Appellate
Body in Bananas III appeared to provide a clear standard, articulating what
conditions would have to be met to have an agreement that would effectively

152

AB Report, Peru – Agricultural Products, supra note 120.
Id. ¶ 5.119.
154
Panel Report, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products,
¶ 7.69, WTO Doc. WT/DS457/R (adopted Nov. 27, 2014) [hereinafter Panel Report, Peru –
Agricultural Products].
155
Id. ¶¶ 7.72–7.73.
156
Id. ¶ 7.82.
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preclude the jurisdiction of a WTO Panel: an explicit or logically necessary
waiver of WTO jurisdiction.
As discussed above in Part IV.F, the Appellate Body in Peru –
Agricultural Products held that the WTO legal system does not allow
Members to depart from the rights and obligations of the covered
agreements, except in accordance with the lex specialis of the WTO itself
concerning such deviations, including above all GATT Article XXIV.157
But, could two or more Members who sought to do so work around this
limitation by deviating from WTO rights and obligations through an explicit
and unambiguous agreement not to enforce those rights and obligations in
the context of WTO dispute settlement?158
In Peru – Agricultural Products, the Appellate Body seems to narrow the
circumstances where an agreement to forbear WTO dispute settlement would
be effective in defeating the panels’ right to exercise jurisdiction to those
where the forbearance is in the context of a “solution mutually acceptable to
the parties” that is “consistent with the covered agreements.”159 The
implication is that, however clear and unambiguous, ex ante exclusion160 of
WTO dispute settlement in a regional agreement will not be effective to
defeat the jurisdiction of a WTO Panel. Thus, if the facts in the Argentina –
Poultry dispute had been different, and the Protocol of Olivos had been in
force, constituting a clear statement of the commitment to an exclusive
forum, this would still not have been a sufficient basis for an estoppel/good
faith grounds to defeat the jurisdiction of the WTO Panel.
The implications of Peru – Agricultural Products are thus significant.
The Appellate Body’s ruling seems at the same time to constitutionalize
WTO law as a legal system from which deviations are only permitted by its
own specialized rules, while also constitutionalizing the dispute settlement
system by permitting an opt out from the WTO’s judicial jurisdiction only
where the WTO’s dispute settlement organs determine, through exercising
their competence-competence, that the “solution” is itself “consistent with
the covered agreements.”161
While this approach appears to reinforce the status of the Appellate Body
as a supreme judicial organ for the interpretation and application of
157

AB Report, Peru – Agricultural Products, supra note 120.
See Panel Report, Peru – Agricultural Products, supra note 154, ¶ 7.82 (in accordance
with Bananas III standard).
159
AB Report, Peru – Agricultural Products, supra note 120, ¶¶ 5.25–5.26; DSU, supra
note 127, art. 3.5.
160
I.e., prior to a dispute under the DSU.
161
See Joanna Langille, Neither Constitution nor Contract: Understanding the WTO by
Examining the Legal Limits on Contracting out through Regional Trade Agreements, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1482 (2011).
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international trade law, it also preserves the integrity of the
political/diplomatic waiver process that provides explicitly for the possibility
of deviations from WTO norms and indeed the possible exclusion of WTO
dispute settlement altogether. Where one or more Members seek to limit
their WTO rights and obligations, even inter se, they must proceed through
this political/diplomatic track, which is transparent and entails deliberation
and negotiation with the entire WTO community. Peru – Agricultural
Products and Turkey – Textiles are, thus, mutually reinforcing, for in Turkey
– Textiles the Appellate Body imposes a strict necessity test on any trade
restrictive deviation from WTO rules in the context of a free trade area or
customs area.
What we might call the “constitutionalization” effect of Peru –
Agricultural Products and Turkey – Textiles, taken together, has an important
implication in the regionalism context: Side-deals, bilateral or plurilateral,
cannot be used be adjust liberalization downward from what is legally
entrenched in the WTO system; such deals cannot be used to retake national
sovereignty on an ad hoc basis, as it were. New types of safeguards or trade
remedies, as proposed in the context of the Trump Administration, for
example, cannot be enacted through “deals” with individual countries, to the
extent that they are not WTO-consistent.
The Appellate Body’s
constitutionalization approach seems to address, at the jurisprudential level,
the fear that through the proliferation of preferential or regional
arrangements, the multilateral trading order could unravel into a bowl of
spaghetti. These cases ensure that WTO law operates autonomously and in
full enforceable effect, from anything that might be agreed bilaterally or
regionally.
C. Mexico – Soft Drinks
The clash of jurisdictions issue also arose in the Mexico – Soft Drinks
case, a case involving the United States and Mexico that arose out of what
was initially a NAFTA dispute.162 According to Mexico, the United States
and Mexico had negotiated an understanding (under NAFTA rules)
concerning sweeteners in soft drinks, including cane sugar and HighFructose Corn Syrup (HFCS). Mexico felt that the United States was in
breach of this understanding and that it had persistently blocked the

162
Panel Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WTO Doc.
WT/DS308/R (Oct. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Panel Report, Mexico – Soft Drinks]; Appellate Body
Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WTO Doc.
WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter AB Report, Mexico – Soft Drinks].
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formation of a NAFTA dispute panel to resolve the matter—itself a NAFTA
breach. In response to these alleged violations of NAFTA, Mexico imposed
a discriminatory tax on HFCS, favoring domestic producers of cane sugar.
The United States brought proceedings in the WTO, claiming that the
discriminatory tax was in violation of GATT Article III:2.163 Mexico argued
that the Panel should decline jurisdiction to hear the dispute, on the grounds
that the appropriate and adequate forum was NAFTA, given that the
underlying dispute concerned the resolution of Mexico’s complaints that the
United States had violated NAFTA.164
Mexico’s position was not, however, based on any explicit choice of
forum clause in NAFTA that might be an impediment to bringing
proceedings at the WTO.165 Instead, Mexico maintained that the Panel
should exercise its inherent discretion under the DSU to refuse jurisdiction
where a WTO ruling would not contribute to a “positive solution” of the
dispute.166 Moreover, Mexico asserted that NAFTA was the more
appropriate forum, since a NAFTA tribunal would have jurisdiction to
consider both parts of the claim: Mexico’s arguments about the United
States’ NAFTA violations and the United States’ argument that the tax
measures were illegal.167 And in the WTO proceedings, Mexico would have
no opportunity to pursue its counterclaims against the United States for
NAFTA violations, since the WTO dispute settlement organs cannot provide
a remedy for violations of non-WTO law.
The Panel’s report indicates that, as a general matter, the DSU places it
under a legal obligation to take jurisdiction over complaints of violations of
the covered agreements, since the DSU gave Members a right of recourse to
dispute settlement in cases of an alleged violation of WTO disciplines.168
Thus, to refuse jurisdiction would be to diminish rights and obligations under
the DSU, which is prohibited under DSU Article 3.2. The Panel noted that
there might be other cases where its jurisdiction is “legally constrained” even
though there is a valid complaint of violation, and adequate terms of
reference flowing from that complaint.169 But this was not such a situation.
(This may have been because in this case, Mexico did not allege bad faith on

163
GATT, supra note 3, art. III:2 (the National Treatment obligation); see Panel Report,
Mexico – Soft Drinks, supra note 162, ¶ 1.2.
164
Panel Report, Mexico – Soft Drinks, supra note 162, ¶ 3.2.
165
Unlike the United States’ concern about Mexico’s own choice of forum in Tuna II.
166
Panel Report, Mexico – Soft Drinks, supra note 162, ¶ 4.154.
167
This is because NAFTA essentially incorporates GATT III:2.
168
Panel Report, Mexico – Soft Drinks, supra note 162, ¶ 5.13.
169
Id. ¶ 7.10.
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the part of the United States in bringing the proceedings. Instead, its
argument was better understood as essentially a forum non conviens claim.)
The Panel also referred to Article 3.10 of the DSU, which states that
WTO Members should not link “complaints and counter-complaints in
regard to distinct matters.”170 But the Panel did not consider in any depth
Mexico’s argument that in fact the matters were not distinct since the
measures complained of in the WTO were in fact countermeasures in
response to alleged violations of a different treaty—NAFTA. The Panel then
suggested that, in theory, there might be some circumstances where a Panel
“might be entitled . . . to find that a dispute would more appropriately be
pursued before another tribunal.”171 But it could not do so by reason of the
advantage to the claimant of being able to link a different claim or distinct
counter-claim in the other forum; the Panel suggested if that kind of concern
could be taken into account there could be a slippery slope where “the
decision to exercise jurisdiction would become political rather than legal in
nature.”172
Mexico appealed the Panel’s decision to exercise jurisdiction. On appeal,
the Appellate Body reiterated its position that while there may be some
inherent discretion that a Panel has to decide the boundaries of its
jurisdiction, it must operate always in accordance with the provisions of the
DSU.173 The Appellate Body found no basis in the DSU for the Panel to
decline jurisdiction in this case, upholding its general reasoning. However,
the Appellate Body also stated that it was not ruling on how a Panel might
decide on jurisdiction if there were an exclusive forum clause that was
activated under the other treaty or if the underlining dispute had already been
decided in the other forum.174
Mexico had also argued that the Appellate Body should follow the clean
hands doctrine articulated in Chorzow Factory case, which holds that “one
party cannot avail himself of the fact that the other has not fulfilled some
obligation, or has not had recourse to some means of redress, if the former
party has, by some illegal act, prevented the latter from fulfilling the
obligation in question, or from having recourse to the tribunal which would
have been open to him.”175 The only reason the Soft Drinks dispute was
before the WTO, Mexico argued, was because the United States was
preventing Mexico from accessing “the tribunal which would have been
170
171
172
173
174
175

Id. ¶ 7.15; DSU, supra note 127, art. 3.10.
Panel Report, Mexico – Soft Drinks, supra note 162, ¶ 7.17.
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AB Report, Mexico – Soft Drinks, supra note 162.
Id. ¶ 54.
Id. ¶ 31.
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open to it” through an illegal act—the United States’ violation of NAFTA
dispute settlement procedures which prevented a NAFTA claim from being
brought.176 In response, the Appellate Body held that applying this doctrine
would require it to make a judgment that NAFTA had been violated, and that
the WTO dispute settlement system cannot be used “to determine rights and
obligations outside the covered agreements.”177
It is this last jurisprudential move that, arguably, has real systemic and
perhaps constitutional significance for the WTO/PTA relationship. It
strongly establishes the autonomy of the WTO dispute settlement system
from other legal orders, in perhaps, analogously the way that the European
Court of Justice Grand Chamber established the autonomy of the UN Charter
legal framework from the European law framework that the Court was
required to apply.178 The question is whether this autonomy is inconsistent
with the deep structure of international law.179
One might also argue, though, that the strong notion of autonomy here
expressed by the Appellate Body also protects the WTO system itself from
the consequences of regional trade forums making their own determinations
that WTO norms have been violated—which Members of the WTO are
prohibited from allowing under Article 23 of the DSU.180 In other words, the
WTO’s holding in Soft Drinks may imply a sort of comity, where the WTO
neither countenances determinations of its own rules and obligations by other
fora nor accepts jurisdiction to determine rights and obligations under those
agreements, not even for the purpose of resolving any possible policy or legal
conflict arising from the joint applicability in the respective fora of the rights
and obligations of each legal system.
VI. CONCLUSION
Recent developments in the politics of international trade have once again
brought debates over the legal relationship between regionalism and
multilateralism to the fore. In light of these developments and the scholarly
consensus that the WTO’s jurisprudence has provided insufficient guidance
176

Id. ¶ 56.
Id.
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See Case C–402/05 P and C–415/05, P. Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v.
Council and Commission [2008] ECR I–6351.
179
For example, the notion that jus cogens and the U.N. Charter would prevail over the
rights and obligations provided by treaty (to the extent of any inconsistency) could only be
given full effect if the tribunal charged with settling disputes under the treaty were able, in
order to apply these meta-rules of international law, to determine whether in fact, if the treaty
were applied, a violation of the Charter or jus cogens would occur.
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DSU, supra note 127, art. 23.
177

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

SPHERES OF COMMERCE

5/11/2018 5:44 PM

689

on the regionalism/multilateralism relationship, this Article has undertaken a
reassessment of WTO jurisprudence on regionalism to explore certain key
aspects of the legal relationship between PTAs and the WTO.
We argue that there are two key aspects of this legal relationship that can
be gleaned from WTO case law, which are crucial to determining what types
of PTAs are WTO-compatible. First, the WTO’s adjudicatory bodies have
continually asserted their jurisdiction to adjudicate whether PTAs are WTOcompatible, both vis-à-vis the WTO’s political organs and PTA dispute
settlement mechanisms. This approach is evident in the Appellate Body’s
report in Turkey – Textiles, which made clear that all aspects of Article
XXIV were justiciable by the WTO’s dispute settlement bodies (and not just
the WTO’s political bodies), and it was affirmed in the subsequent Peru –
Agricultural Products case. And it is evident in the Appellate Body’s
jurisprudence on competing PTA fora, where in cases like Argentina –
Poultry, Peru – Agricultural Products, and Mexico – Soft Drinks, the
Appellate Body has limited the ability of Member states to contract out of the
WTO’s dispute settlement procedures and asserted the autonomy of the
WTO’s legal order.
Second, the WTO’s adjudicatory bodies have strictly limited the extent to
which states can contract out of the substance of WTO obligations through
PTAs. On our reading of Turkey – Textiles, the Appellate Body has held that
Article XXIV only permits states to derogate from WTO obligations that are
logically necessary to the formation of a CU or FTA—a standard that does
not include regulatory discrimination. And this standard is to be applied by
the WTO’s dispute settlement bodies not just at the initial moment when a
PTA is signed and ratified but rather should apply to any subsequent
amendments to the PTA.
Ultimately, the approach of the Appellate Body to the interaction of
preferential trade arrangements, bilateral or regional, with the WTO legal
system is to reinforce the autonomy, if not a certain kind of supremacy or at
least primacy, of the WTO legal order, at a time when regional and bilateral
agreements and negotiations proliferate, partially in response to the supposed
blockage or failure of the political and diplomatic processes of the WTO. On
balance, the Appellate Body makes exit to regional dispute settlement harder
and certainly shows no interest in treaty interpretations that could
accommodate or facilitate harmonious co-existence with regional regimes.
The question now, however, concerns the durability of the Appellate Body as
a supreme judicial authority for the WTO system. The United States’
blockage of the appointment of new Appellate Body Members, based on a
critique of the Appellate Body that is far from clear in its emphasis or scope,
has led to considerable anxiety about the future of the Appellate Body’s role.
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This subject is beyond the remit of the present Article; however,
jurisprudence of the Appellate Body that we have discussed remains as
“shadow of the law” in which any political accommodations between
WTO system and regional arrangements (such as waivers) will
formulated.
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